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The Constructive Receipt Of
Dividends By Stockholders Of A
Closely Held Corporation
By WiLILA. CHAPis BBFFoBD*
I
INTmODUCTION
The Corporation as a Separate Tax Entity
For well over a century there has been much writing and
discussion both as to the origin and nature of a corporation. The
most often quoted definition is a statement of Chief Justice Mar-
shall in the early Supreme Court case of Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward,' where he stated: "A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law". This so called "fictional" theory of the nature
of a corporation gave rise to the doctrine that a corporation is
separate and distinct from its stockholders. It naturally lead to
the conclusion that an individual stockholder, in the absence of
special circumstances, was not liable either for the tort of the
corporation or for a breach of contract by the corporation.2 The
* This article is part one of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois, 1958. Parts two and three will be published in forthcoming
issues of the Journal, and will discuss some tax problems of closely held corpora-
tions under the following headings: Compensation Paid to Stockholder Officers
of the Corporation; Rentals and Royalties Paid to Stockholders; Distributions of
Property and Bargain Sales and Purchases; Bargain Use of Corporate Property;
Payments on Behalf of the Stockholder by the Corporation; and Purchase of In-
surance by the Corporation's Insuring the Lives of the Stockholders.
** LL.B., University of Kentucky, 1957; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1958.
1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
2 The court in Stone v. Cleveland, 202 N.Y. 352, 96 N.E. 816, 817 (1911),
stated: "It is well established that the ownership of a majority of the stock of a
corporation, while it gives a certain control of the corporation, does not give that
control of corporate transactions which makes the holder of the stock responsible
for the latter'.
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central feature of a corporation is, therefore, that it assures in-
dividual stockholders freedom from liability beyond their capital
investment in the corporation- the corporate capital stands in
lieu of individual liability of the participants. This "creature" may
be distinguished from other forms of business organizations by
the fact that in a corporation there is: (1) ownership by the
corporate entity of property embarked in the undertaking; (2)
centralization of management; (3) control of management through
selection of directors by members; (4) continuity of enterprise
without interruption by death of a member or transfer of stock;
and (5) limited personal liability of the members.3 The fact that
the corporation is a separate juristic entity does not mean, how-
ever, that it stands inviolable and immovable. Courts have often
lifted the "corporate veil" and looked to the underlying owners
in order to prevent injustice, fraud or the defeat of public
policy. 4
In the administration of the tax laws, recognition of the
separate corporate entity has not always been the general rule.
The first federal income tax act ignored the corporate entity and
taxed the stockholders directly on their distributive shares of the
corporate income.5 This Civil War legislation was allowed to
expire, however, and no subsequent Revenue Acts have attempted
to tax in this manner. This is far from saying that the corporate
entity remains unimpeached in the field of taxation. Even though
the general rule is that the corporate entity will be recognized
and the income of the corporation will not be taxed to the stock-
holders until a formal declaration of a dividend is made, excep-
tions to this rule have been, and are being made. An exception
has arisen and is applied in cases where the courts determine
that certain transactions between the corporation and its stock-
holders have as their purpose the avoidance of taxes. In this in-
3 See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 844 (1935), for a good discussion
of the various characteristics of a corporation.
4Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Grace and Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920),
where the corporation was inadequately capitalized to carry on the business for
which it was organized, the controlling stockholder was denied limited liability.
5 Section 117 of an Act to provide Internal Revenue, etc., 18 Stat. 223, 282
(1864), directed that "the gains and profits of all companies, whether in-
corporated or partnership ...shall be included in estimating the annual gains,
profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or other-
wise". This legislation was sustained in Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
1 (1870).
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stance the court will look to the "substance" of the transaction,
rather than its "form" and apply the tax statutes accordingly.6
If the contention is made by the Government that the separate
entity of the corporation should be ignored, it is usually for the
purpose of supporting an argument that (1) the income of the
corporation should be taxed to the stockholder or (2) that a
transaction between the corporation and the stockholders should
be disregarded for tax purposes. Of course ignoring the corporate
entity can be an advantage to the stockholder 7 but it is usually
to his disadvantage. In scrutinizing a particular transaction, the
attitude which the courts will take was well stated in Weiss v.
Stearns in the following language: 9
Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what
was actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the
participante; and when applying the provisions of the Six-
teenth Amendment and income laws enacted thereunder we
must regard matters of substance and not merely form.
(Emphasis added.)
This quotation is merely an express statement of the principle
that the courts will look to the "substance" of a transaction rather
than the "form" in determining tax questions, and serves as a
warning that the corporate entity will not automatically insulate
a transaction from the reach of the revenue laws.
6 In Linn Timber Co. v. U.S., 236 U.S. 574 (1915), the corporate entity was
disregarded by the Court on a finding that the corporation was a "mere toor' of
the organizing and controlling stockholder; U.S. v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).7 Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F. 2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945). In this case a
partnership formed two corporations and transferred a piece of real estate to each,
or e ose of deterring creditors of one of the parties. The partners con-
tended a1 te to corporations were mere "dummies" and that their separate
entities should be disregarded, and that the income from the real estate should be
taxed to the partners who were the sole stockholders. The Court upheld this con-
tention as to one of the corporations, which did nothing but take and hold the
title to the real estate conveyed to it. As to the other corporation, which engaged
in some business, the Court held that its separate entity should not be disregarded;
accord, Southern Pacific Co. v. Lame, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); cf. Moline Properties
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), where the corporate entity was upheld as
it served a business purpose and was not a mere agent" of the stockholder.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) has also been cited as standing for the
proposition that the corporate entity may be disregarded to the stockholders ad-
vantage.
8265 U.S. 242 (1924).
9Id. at 254.
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Tax Problems of the Close Corporation
Nowhere has this "form versus substance" doctrine been more
vigorously applied than in cases involving close corporations. 0
The tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code apply to the
closely-held corporation in the same manner, with minor ex-
ceptions, as they do in the case of large public corporations.
However, since the stockholders of a close corporation are few in
number, the close relationship between the stockholders and the
corporation give rise to tax problems unlike and in addition to
those faced by large public corporations. Since corporate earn-
ings may be taxed once at corporate rates and again when dis-
tributed as dividends, the total tax is less if such profits are
distributed to stockholders in some form other than as dividends.
Due to the fact that by their very nature greater opportunity
exists for tax avoidance, transactions between stockholders and
their close corporations have in recent years been scrutinized very
carefully by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts to
prevent the corporation from distributing profits in a form other
than dividends. If corporate profits can be distributed in a form
which is deductible from corporate income, the attributes of
double taxation can be largely avoided. The stockholders would
thus enjoy the security of the corporate form with its limited
liability and in effect the taxability of a partnership with respect
to the amounts distributed. In scrutinizing the various transac-
tions that frequently occur between such a corporation and its
stockholders, the courts have come up with the doctrine of "con-
structive receipt" of dividends. Thus a formal declaration of a
dividend may not be necessary for a given distribution to be tax-
able as such. Book entries may be disregarded, and actual facts
considered in determining whether the corporation has distributed
a dividend to its stockholders.1 The following are among the
most frequently occuring transactions that may give rise to the
receipt of constructive dividends by the stockholders:
(1) stockholder advances and loans to the corporation;
10 There is no unanimity of opinion as to the exact definition of a close
corporation, but it is generally considered that this term includes corporations
whose stock is owned by a sole stockholder, several unrelated stockholders or mem-
bers of a family group.
II John T. Kennedy, 16 B.T.A. 1372 (1929).
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(2) advances and loans by the corporation to some or all of the
stockholders;
(3) compensation paid to stockholder-officers of the corporation;
(4) rents and royalties paid to stockholders;
(5) distributions of property and bargain sales and purchases;
(6) bargain use of corporate property;
(7) payments on behalf of the shareholder by the corporation;
(8) purchase of insurance by the corporation upon the lives of
the stockholders.
Although these transactions are not the only ones which may
give rise to constructive dividends, the question arises more often
in these cases. The question of whether a particular transaction
results in a dividend may arise in several ways. However, it most
frequently arises where the corporation is seeking to deduct a
particular distribution to a stockholder from corporate income on
the ground that it is a business expense, such as interest on loans,
compensation for services, rents, royalties, etc. In all cases, the
basic issue is the same, namely, whether the particular item con-
stitutes a legitimate business expense, or whether it is in reality
a distribution of a dividend to the stockholder in a disguised
form. In many cases, whether a distribution is a dividend, salary,
interest or royalty would make no difference to the stockholder
inasmuch as all such payments would be taxable to him as
ordinary income. 2 However, in some situations to be noted later,
the nature of payment may be very important to him for tax
purposes.
In applying the substance test to the various transactions listed
above, a vast area of confusion and uncertainty has arisen. This
uncertainty has developed to such an extent that it is highly
dangerous or disasterous tax wise for stockholders of a close
corporation to enter into certain transactions with it. Unantici-
pated taxes may create financial hardship or ruin in many cases.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of these trans-
actions in an endeavor to evaluate present concepts and to suggest
some modifications.
12 Section 116 of the Code allows, however, an exclusion from gross income
of the first $50.00 of dividends received by an individual each year from a domestic
corporation. Section 34 also allows as a tax credit 4% of dividends received by
an individual each year in excess of $50.00.
1958]
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II
STOCKOLDER ADvANcEs AND LoANs TO =UK CORPORATION
Section 163 of the Code provides that, "there shall be allowed
as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year
on indebtedness." Section 162 also allows as a deduction from
corporate income "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business." Thus, if a corporation borrows money for use in its
business, any interest paid for the use of such money is deductible
from the income of the corporation. To the extent that such
loans are obtained from stockholders, taxes on corporate earnings
and profits are accordingly reduced. These advances may be
made at the time that the business is incorporated or sometime
after incorporation. This technique of making advances to the
corporation seems to be extremely attractive in the case of family
or other closely held corporations. The advantages are obvious.
In addition to deducting the interest paid on the obligation, it is
possible to retain substantial amounts of the corporate earnings
and profits in the corporate treasury to fund the indebtedness
without incurring section 531 surtax liability. Also, in case the
corporation is liquidated and loss occurs, the amount so advanced
and not recovered can be taken as a bad debt deduction instead
of as a capital loss.
The question of whether advances are bona fide debts or
capital contributions usually arises in three major situations. First,
the purported creditor (stockholder) may seek to take a bad
debt deduction rather than a capital loss upon default or liquida-
tion of the corporation without complete recovery of the principal
sum. Second, the corporation may seek to take a deduction for
payment of interest upon the purported loan. Thirdly, when re-
payments of the alleged loans are made, a question may arise as
to whether the distribution is a capital recovery by the stock-
holder or in reality a dividend from the corporation. If the ad-
vance is held to be a capital contribution, the corporation will be
denied an interest deduction and the shareholder will be deemed
to have received a "constructive dividend" from the corporation.
Regardless of which of these three questions is before the court,
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the same issue is presented, namely, whether the transaction gives
rise to a bona fide debt. Therefore no attempt will be made to
classify the cases on the basis of the particular question which
was before the court.
No problem is posed when stock or bonds are issued, clearly
distinguishable as such. If the amount of the advance is reason-
able and the security issued to evidence this indebtedness is
clearly a bona fide note or bond, the interest paid will be deducti-
ble from corporate income. It follows that the stockholder will
have a bad debt deduction instead of a capital loss upon default
by the corporation, and any repayment will be a return of capital
to him. Litigation in this area arises, however, as a result of the
issuance of hybrid securities which have some of the character-
istics of both indebtedness and stock. In this instance, the
corporation attempts to combine some of the advantages of both
stock and indebtedness for the benefit of the corporation or the
stockholders or both. Until recently, the only question was one
as to the nature of the securities issued. As soon as it was
determined that the securities were either stock or indebtedness,
the proper treatment for tax purposes was settled. This only re-
quired an intrinsic examination of the securities for the purpose
of determining their true character. Even though no one factor
was controlling, some of the most important factors in determin-
ing whether a particular security represented indebtedness or a
contribution of capital included: (1) maturity date;"3 (2) the
extent of the obligation, that is, whether the issuer must pay a
fixed interest rate regardless of earnings, or to pay only if the
corporation has earnings; 14 (8) right to share in profits;' 5 (4)
whether the security is subordinate or superior to the claims of
general creditors;"6 (5) voting rights;'1 and (6) whether the
13 A definite maturity date is ordinarily the essential element of a creditor
investment. In 241 Corporation, P-H 1956 T. C. Mem. Dec. see. 56174, a security
was held to be a stock investment when it contained no fixed maturity date.
'4 Pocatello Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.
Ida. 1956), held a security to be stock when interest and principal was only pay-
able if the corporation was insolvent.
15 When this factor is present in a particular security, it will almost always
be held to be an equity investment. See Pottstown Finance Co. v. United States,
73 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. Penn. 1947).
16 Wettsrau Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F. 2d 158 (8th Cir. 1950);
Pocatello Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 14.
17 Drayton Mills, 19 B.T.A. 76 (1930). One of the basic rights of a common
stockholder is the right to vote. Thus, where this right accompanies a security,
this.strongly indicates a share of stock.
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security is redeemable at the election of the holder.'8 The way in
which the advance is carried on the corporate books, although not
controlling, has been considered significant.19
Thus, early cases held that if a given security did not have
the characteristics of stock, it was a true debt even though it
comprised a very substantial portion of the operating funds of the
corporation.20 In fairly recent years, however, the terms of the
instrument have become increasingly less important. Even
though a particular security has all of the attributes of an in-
debtedness, it may have to undergo additional tests to determine
whether a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship exists or whether
the stock holder has in reality made an equity investment in the
corporation through an advance. Where the financing of the
corporation is largely with borrowed capital, inadequate capitali-
zation may result. The corporation is said to be "thin" if the
ratio of debt to stock is considered too high. Where this occurs,
it may be held that the advance by the stockholder was in reality
an equity investment in the corporation and not a loan. Although
inadequate capitalization was mentioned in the opinions of the
Tax Court in several early cases,2 ' it was first definitely stated as a
factor in Swoby Corporation,22 decided by the court in 1947.
Although its decision was not based on inadequate capitalization
alone23 inasmuch as there were features of the security which gave
it resemblance to stock, the court insinuated that nominal stock
investment is a significant factor in the determination of whether
a particular security represents a debt or stock. The court ex-
pressly referred to the Supreme Court decision of John Kelly Com-
pany v. Commissioner,24 where in the course of its opinion that
Court made the following comment:
2 5
18 Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. 2d 595 (9th Cir. 1931).
19 The weight to be given tbis factor was considered in R. E. Nelson, 19
T.C. 575 (1952).
20 O.P.P. Holding Corporation, 30 B.T.A. 337 (1934), aft'd, 76 F. 2d 11 (2d
Cir. 1935). There the capital of the corporation was paid in by the issuance of
$10,000 in capital stock and $250,000 in debentures for a debt ratio of 25 tol.
21 Edward G. Janeway, 2 T.C. 197 (1943), affd, 147 F. 2d 602 (2d Cir.
1945); 1432 Broadway Corporation, 4 T. C. 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 F. 2d 885
(2d Cir. 1947).
22 9 T.C. 887 (1947).
23 There was only $200.00 in common stock compared with $250,000 in
debentures.
24326 U.S. 521 (1946).
25 Id. at 526. The statement of the Court in this case was purely dictum as
there was no finding that the corporation was inadequately capitaized.
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As material amounts of capital were invested in stock, we
need not consider the effect of extreme situations such as
nominal stock investments and an obviously excessive debt
structure.
The Supreme Court thus indicated that inadequate capitaliza-
tion may become an important factor justifying a contrary hold-
ing in extreme cases. In Wilshire and Western Sandwiches, Inc.,26
the Tax Court apparently thought this was such a case. Here it
denied an interest deduction where the four stockholders ad-
vanced $55,000 of which $25,000 was evidenced by promissory
notes issued by the corporation. The Court of Appeals for the
ninth circuit reversed, refusing to attach importance to the facts
relied on by the Tax Court and stated:
28
It is not contended that a corporation is without the power
to enter into a debtor and creditor relationship with its
stockholders. The intent of the parties as to the nature of
the transaction controls.
In spite of this early rebuff, however, many subsequent cases
decided both by the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeal have
sustained the element of inadequate capitalization as a factor.
This has been especially true in the case of family or other closely
held corporations. Although in most cases there are other factors
present, these cases do show that debt ratio is something that
cannot be ignored in the lending of money or in the initial
capitalization of corporations. Just how important is not clear.
This whole area is in a state of flux at this time. One thing is
clear, however: There is definitely a maximum limit on indebted-
ness which a corporation can incur without a finding that an
equity investment has been made. A debt to equity ratio of 2,500
to 1 is obviously excessive.2 The same can be said for a ratio of
1000 to 1. 30 In many cases the courts have disapproved much
lesser ratios where under the circumstances it was concluded that
the stock investment, in itself, would be insufficient to carry on
the business. In Artistic Venetian Blind Corporation3' interest
26 P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 48123.
27 175 F. 2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949).
28 Id. at 720.
2 9 Robert L. Osborne, P-H1 1954 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 54133.30 Kipsborough Realty Corporation, P-H 1951 T.C. Mer. Dec. sec. 51291.
31 P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. see. 56043; Cohen v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d
336 (2d Cir. 1945). where the ratio was only 15 to 1.
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paid on a $100,000 note held by a majority stockholder was held
nondeductible where the capital stock was only $10,400. The
court stated that this latter amount was insufficient to carry on
the business of manufacturing venetian blinds which required a
large inventory.
The safe limits of debt to equity ratio are not clear. In Talbot
Mills v. Commissioner,32 the Supreme Court approved a ratio of
4 to 1 between debentures and stock; and in Arthur McDermott,
33
the Tax Court held the notes in question to be true debts even
though the ratio was 19 to 1. The court, in Toledo Blade Co., 4
impliedly approved a ratio of 6 to 1 where, in order to meet notes
due on which capital stock had been pledged as security, the
corporation was recapitalized with stock of $500,000 and de-
bentures of $3,000,000. Here the debentures were held by the
sole stockholder. It has been generally thought that a ratio of
4 to 1 is safe,35 especially where the loans were not made pro-
portionately by the stockholders.
One of the most important factors which is invariably taken
into consideration by the courts is whether the alleged debt
securities are held by the stockholders in the same proportion as
their holdings of stock. In many cases this factor exists along
with inadequate capitalization and may be taken as just another
indication pointing to additional capital contributions. In other
cases, it appears to have emerged as controlling and constitutes
a test in and of itself. In 1482 Broadway Corporation," the
corporation issued 890 shares of stock and debentures in the face
amount of $1,170,000 for property worth at least $1,200,000 and
$40,000 in cash. The debentures appeared to have all the indicia
of debt. As the stock and debentures were issued proportionately
to the stockholders, an interest deduction was denied to the cor-
poration. The court stated:
37
The debentures are in approved legal form.... But, for tax
purposes, their conformity to legal forms is not conclusive.
32326 U.S. 521 (1946).
33 13 T.C. 469 (1944).
34 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), affd, 180 F. 2d 357 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 811 (1950).
35 Greene and Palmer, Current Trends in Corporate Capitalizations and Re-
capitalizations, 8 J. Taxation 75 (1958).
36 Supra note 21.
37 Id. at 1165.
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... The distribution... whether called interest or principal
on debentures or dividends on shares, would go to the same
persons in the same proportions since each had the same
proportionate number of both, and it would not matter to
them whether the distribution was called dividends or in-
terest. (Emphasis added.)
The court did not expressly hold that the debt ratio was
excessive here, but considered as controlling the fact that after
payment of the interest or principal of the debentures, the stock-
holders would have the same proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration. Likewise, in Kipsborough Realty Corporation,38 no in-
terest deduction was allowed where the purported loans were in
proportion to the holdings of the stockholders, each bearing a
1000 to 1 relationship to the value of the stock. Thus, where loans
are made in proportion to stockholdings, this factor, coupled with
an excessive debt ratio, is almost certain to be fatal to an interest
deduction. It appears that the courts at times attach too much
importance to the fact that the loans are proportionate., It is not
uncommon for stockholders of closely held corporations to make
loans in proportion to their stockholdings, even where it is their
intent to make bona fide loans. Such corporations must frequently
turn to their stockholders when they need additional funds either
for operating expenses or expansion. In fact, in many cases this
is the only source of additional capital.
A fairly recent case has further added to the confusion in this
area. In Gooding Amusement Company,39 a partnership consist-
ing of a husband, wife, and infant daughter having, respectively,
4/7, 2/7 and 1/7 interests was dissolved. A new corporation was
formed. The assets, with an approximate book value of $281,000,
were transferred to the corporation for $49,000 in no-par common
stock and $232,000 in interest bearing notes. The partners re-
ceived stock and notes in the same proportion as their respective
interests in the partnership. Other sums were borrowed from the
stockholders from time to time totaling $77,000. Most of these
sums were repaid. The questions presented to the Tax Court were
whether the corporation could deduct the interest on the notes
and whether the repayments of the notes was a taxable dividend
3 8 Supra note 30.
3023 T.C. 408 (1955), aff'd, 236 F. 2d 159 (6th Cir. 1955).
1958]
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to the stockholders. The court held that the interest payments
were not deductible and that the principal payments constituted
dividends. During the years in question, corporate employees
other than the three principal stockholders owned from 24.39
percent to 22.3 percent of its outstanding stock. Employee stock-
holdings were, however, redeemable at the option of the corpora-
tion. The court said that the fact that the payments were not
made pro rata among the stockholders was immaterial and did
not alter the effect of what was done. The language of the court
appears to have introduced a new test to the thin corporation
problem. The court stated:
40
This is another in a long series of cases wherein the stock-
holders of a closely held corporation have attempted to
establish between themselves and the corporation the rela-
tionship of creditor-debtor.
The court stated that the formal criteria of indebtedness were
unquestionably satisfied but stated:
41
The most significant aspect of the instant case, in our view,
is the complete identity of interest between and among the
three noteholders, coupled with their control of the corpora-
tion.... It is, in our opinion, unreasonable to ascribe to the
husband petitioner, F. E. Gooding, an intention at the time
of the issuance of the notes ever to enforce payment of his
notes, especially if to do so would either impair the credit
rating of the corporation, cause it to borrow from other
sources the funds necessary to meet the payments, or bring
about its dissolution. (Emphasis added.)
In answer to the argument that the initial financial structure
did not reveal an excessive ratio of debt to stock,42 the court
stated:
43
The "thin capitalization" factor is only one of the indicia
from which the presence or absence of a debtor-creditor
relationship may be determined. We do not consider it
decisive of the present issue.
Under the court's reasoning, it would seem almost impos-
sible for any closed corporation to issue bonds or notes to its
40 Id. at 417.
41 Id. at 418.
42 On the contrary, it appeared that if good will was attributed to the stock
the debts would probably not exceed the value of the stock.
43 Supra note 39 at 419.
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shareholders, whether at the time of incorporation or subsequent
to its incorporation. Determination of the stockholder's state of
mind or intent at the time the bonds or notes are issued is not
so much a finding of fact as an irrebuttable presumption or in-
ference drawn from the stockholder-corporation relationship in
these cases. If the court's reasoning is to be taken literally,
then it would appear that this case is a step in the direction of
cutting off from close corporations a large source of their loans.
This line of reasoning could be used to strike down all such loans.
Quite naturally the stockholders of such a corporation have no
intent to enforce the obligation if to do so would ruin the corpora-
tion's credit or bring about its dissolution. In a recent article
evaluating the effect of the Gooding case, it was stated:
4
... Tax Court is continuing to follow the intent test laid
down in Gooding case.., where it found the debtors never
intended to enforce their rights as creditors to the detriment
of the corporation.
In spite of the Gooding decision and the above statement as to its
effect, subsequent cases have allowed deductions of interest. In
John V. Rowan v. United States,4 the corporation's capitalization
was $9,000. Husband and wife, sole stockholders of the corpora-
tion advanced sums totaling about $125,000 to the corporation.
The court held that the advances were bonafide loans and that
the interest was deductible by the corporation. Likewise, in the
recent case of Bakhaus and Burke, Inc.,46 a corporation was organ-
ized with capital of $30,000 and the three organizers who were
partners transferred to the corporation $131,670.16 in undistrib-
uted partnership assets and treated this sum as accounts payable.
An interest deduction was allowed by the court even though the
ratio of debt to stock was approximately five to one. The court
held that it was the intent of the parties to treat these assets as
loans and that there was no basis for concluding that the corpora-
tion was thinly capitalized inasmuch as a material amount of
capital was invested in the stock and this was sufficient to carry
on the corporate business.
It is too soon to tell just how strongly the Tax Court will
44 7 J. Taxation 70 (1957).
45 219 F. 2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
40 P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 55227.
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apply its language in the Gooding case to subsequent transactions.
One thing is certain, however; the decision in that case has
added to the uncertainty. The tax consequences are severe for
taxpayers who have made a wrong estimate of the permissible
amount of debt which the courts will sanction. Courts have not
as yet allocated a portion of the indebtedness to be a bona fide
loan, considering the remainder as an equity investment. A con-
structive dividend is now imposed as to the full amount, instead
of allowing an interest deduction, bad debt or capital recovery
as to the part that was not excessive. The taxpayer either wins
or loses with respect to the whole amount. It would appear more
equitable to determine how much of the debt is allowable and
then disallow the balance instead of disallowing all when a
smaller debt would have been recognized if the stockholders had
not been so ambitious or had not inadvertently exceeded the per-
missible limit. While this method would be more just, it still
would not give a clear and definite answer to the problem. Litiga-
tion would still be necessary to determine the permissible amount
in a particular case. Legislation thus appears to be the obvious
solution.
A possible answer to this problem is to impose on stockholder's
loans an absolute limitation, disallowing any interest deduction,
bad debt loss or capital recovery on any indebtedness in excess
of the stipulated ratio to capital investment. Setting a permissi-
ble limit is not an innovation in this area. Recognizing that the
income of a corporation could be drawn out in the form of in-
terest, Congress early sought to prevent this by setting a limit
on the amount of indebtedness which would be recognized for
tax purposes. The Revenue Act of 1909, imposing a tax on the
net income of corporations, allowed a deduction from income for
"interest actually paid within the year on its bonded or other in-
debtedness not in excess of the paid-up capital stock of such
corporation."47 The 1913 Act allowed an interest deduction upon
the amount of the indebtedness not to exceed one-half of the sum
of its interest bearing indebtedness and its paid up capital stock
outstanding at the close of the taxable year.48 The Act of 1916
allowed a deduction for interest on indebtedness not to exceed
47 Revenue Act of 1909, sec. 88 Second, 36 Stat. 113.
48 Revenue Act of 1913, sec. 11 G(b), 38 Stat. 173.
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the sum of paid up capital stock and ofie half of the interest bear-
ing indebtedness.49 With World War I and the adoption of an
excess profits tax, it was considered unfair not to allow a deduc-
tion of the entire indebtedness of the corporation since borrowed
capital was not includable in computing capital for the purpose
of the war profits and excess profits tax. When the excess profits
legislation was repealed, no attempt was made by Congress to
reinstate the prior limitation. The problem thus seemed to have
been dormant until the Supreme Court issued its famous dictum
in the John Kelly case. None would contend that there should be
no limits upon corporate indebtedness. Failure to establish a
limitation would allow corporate profits to be distributed to the
stockholders from the corporation largely free of corporation in-
come taxes. Taxation of the income of corporations would thus
be a useless gesture. The crucial question is what should be the
rule governing this problem?
Many proposals have been made as to how to handle this
problem. Notable among these is that recommended by the
American Law Institute in 1952. Under this proposal it is pro-
vided that interest shall be deductible upon indebtedness which
is defined as follows:r °
"Debt" or "indebtedness" shall include in all events, but
shall not be limited to, any unconditional obligation to pay
a sum certain in money-
(1) which will mature on or before a fixed date;
(2) which is undertaken in return for an adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth or which is distrib-
uted as a dividend to the shareholders of a corporation;
(3) which is not subordinated to the claims of trade
creditors generally;
(4) which, if undertaken by the corporation, does not
entitle the obligee to vote for directors of the obligor, except
in the event of default; and
(5) payments, if any, for the use of the principal
amounts of which are not dependent in amount upon the
earnings of the obligor and are unconditionally payable not
later than the maturity date of the principal amount.
49 Revenue Act of 1916, see. 12(a) Third, 89 Stat. 768.
50 ALl Fed. Income Tax Stat. sec. xSOO(g) (Feb. 1952 Draft).
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Thus, if the terms of a particular instrument meet the conditions
stated above, it would automatically be regarded as a debt instru-
ment, with the consequence that interest paid would be deducti-
ble and, if the instrument should become worthless, the holder
would be allowed a bad debt deduction. If an instrument failed
to meet these requirements, its status as a debt or equity instru-
ment would be determined from the facts and circumstances on
the basis of existing case law. It will be noted that the drafting
committee made no provision covering cases where there was
pro rata ownership by the stockholders of such debt instruments.
It was their conclusion that pro rata ownership should not oc-
casion nonrecognition as indebtedness of otherwise unobjection-
able instruments. In this respect it is believed that The American
Law Institute is right. More significant, however, is the fact that
no limitation was set on the amount of indebtedness which could
be incurred. The committee stated as its reason that "analysis
of the cases indicates that, except for the Tax Court cases of
Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. No. 6 (1950), and George L. Sogg, 9
T.C.M. 927 (1950), a limitation of this sort is not a part of present
law."51 Hindsight now shows that this conclusion is wrong. In-
adequate capitalization is definitely with us and must be coped
with. It is not enough to state as the committee did that "the tax
saving or tax avoidance made possible by further increasing the
debt ratio is hardly significant."52 While the tax saving might be
small in any one year, this amount is cumulative in that there is an
interest deduction every year. Moreover, upon maturity of the
instruments, the tax savings upon redemption could be substantial
by reason of the treatment of the payment as a return of capital
rather than as a divided. It is believed that some limitation should
exist. In setting any limit, however, care must be exercised not
to set the limitation too low. The need for debt financing varies
among different industries and in particular situations within a
given industry. The Taxation Section of the American Bar As-
sociation has recently drafted a proposal to deal with the "thin"
incorporation problem. The proposal submitted by this organiza-
51 Id. at 263. It was, however, recognized that where the amount of the
indebtedness is so great that there is no equity interest, such indebtedness should
not be recognized.
52 Id. at 264.
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tion states that a corporation would not be too "thin" provided:5 3
(1) Shareholder notes are not subordinated to the
claims of the other trade creditors;
(2) repayment of the principal amount of the notes is
not dependent upon corporate earnings and the notes are
unconditionally payable at maturity;
(3) when qualifying under some but not all of the
above requirements, the taxpayer can establish by a pro-
ponderance of the evidence that the failure to qualify was
due to the corporation's business requirements;
(4) if the ratio exceeds ten to one based on book values,
the excess debt will not qualify as a bona fide debt.
Upon examination, it appears that the above proposal has real
merit. First, it would provide certainty in an otherwise clouded
area of the tax law. Secondly, the ratio is not so high as to allow
corporations to distribute all their earnings to stockholders in the
guise of interest, but high enough to provide the flexibility which
is needed in the financing of some corporations. If it is found
necessary to exceed the ratio in particular circumstances, the
burden of not being able to take the full interest deduction or the
full amount of the loan as a bad debt loss should not be great.
III
ADVANCES AND LoANs RY TE CORPORATION TO SoMm OR
ALL OF Tim STOCKHOLDERS
As in the case of stock holder advances to a corporation, it is
settled that a corporation may make advances and loans to its
stockholders.54 If the loans are bona fide, the consequences are
the same as in the case of loans to outsiders. This area, however,
appears to be as unsettled and uncertain as stockholder loans to
the corporation. Moreover, the tax consequences of this trans-
action appear to be more severe. Since it would be a violation
of the rights of minority stockholders for withdrawals to be made
by the majority or controlling stockholders in a corporation, such
a transaction almost always occurs in the case of closely held
58 Greene and Palmer, supra note 35, at 77.
54 Kate E. Ryan, 2 B.T.A. 1130 (1925); John Hamilton Perkins, P-H 1957
T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 57128.
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corporations where there is only one or a few stockholders. When
the Commissioner challenges a purported "loan" he does so for
the purpose of preventing the corporation from distributing its
earnings in the guise of loans. As in the case of loans by stock-
holders, the determination of whether a particular withdrawal is
a loan or a distribution of a taxable dividend depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case." The primary question to be
determined, therefore, is one of intent: Was it the intent of the
stockholders and of the corporation to make a loan or to pay a
dividend at the time the withdrawal occurred? Any subsequent
attempt to treat as a loan what was in reality a dividend when
made, will be disregarded.56 This "intent" determination is com-
plicated somewhat by the fact that the corporation may be under
the exclusive control of the stockholder and, therefore, the intent
of the stockholder. However, control is not significant in this
determination. In Carl L. White,'7 the Tax Court stated:5
8
The important fact is not... [taxpayer's] measure of con-
trol over the company, but whether the withdrawals were
in fact loans at the time they were paid out.... The char-
acter of the withdrawals depends upon petitioner's intent
and whether he took the company's money for permanent
use in lieu of dividends or whether he was then only bor-
rowing....
The question of whether a particular withdrawal is a loan or
a dividend may arise at the time of withdrawal or shortly there-
after, or it may not arise until many years later. When the trans-
action comes to the attention of the Commissioner prior to the
expiration of the three year statute of limitations, his contention
is almost invariably that the withdrawal was actually constructive
dividends and income to the stockholder as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code.59 No comprehensive rule has been stated to gov-
55 M. Jackson Crispin, 32 B.T.A. 151 (1935); Victor Shaken, 21 T.C. 785
(1954).
56 Regensburg v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 41 (2d Cir. 1944).
5717 T.C. 1562 (1952).
58 Id. at 1568.
59 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 316(a), which is almost identical with 115(a)
of the 1939 Code stated that: ". .. the term 'dividend' means any distribution of
property made by a corporation to its shareholders-(1) out of its earnings and
profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of its earnings and profits
of the taxable year (computed as of the close of the taxable year), without regard
to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was made.
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ern this situation. Certain factors have, however, been considered
by the courts in either sustaining or overruling the Commis-
sioner's contention. In some cases it appears that the courts have
considered one of several factors to be controlling, while in others
the courts have reached their conclusion by a consideration of
several factors in combination. The factors which have been
deemed significant enough for the courts to mention include the
following:
1. Corporate formalities. Where a corporation by formal reso-
lution of the board of directors declares a dividend, there is no
doubt as to taxability provided there is sufficient earned surplus
or current profits to cover the distribution. Where, however, a
withdrawal has been made without a formal dividend declaration,
the stockholder will point to this fact in attempting to show that
the withdrawal constituted a loan by the corporation. iRecogniz-
ing that profits can be withdrawn in the absence of a formal
declaration, particularly in the case of close corporations, courts
have consistently held that it is not necessary that a dividend be
formally declared before a withdrawal can be taxed as a divi-
dend."0 Such evidence has not been considered material to the
issue, and stockholders are held to have received a "constructive
dividend" if other factors point to such a result.61
2. Corporate treatment of withdrawals. The treatment of the
withdrawal by the corporation in its books and accounts has been
considered significant in almost every case. Since the basic issue
is one of the stockholder-corporate intent, the treatment by the
latter is of course very significant. In cases where the withdrawals
are held to be loans, the courts almost invariably point to the
fact that they were carried on the corporate books as loans, notes
receivable or accounts receivable. 2 On the other hand, when
there is no evidence as to how the withdrawals were handled,
this may justify a finding that they were dividends. 3 Thus, lack
of corporate treatment as a bona fide loan is almost always detri-
mental to the stockholder's case. Bookkeeping entries are not
6o Christopher v. Burnet, 55 F. 2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
61 Rollin C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 342 (1941).
02 Herman M. Rhodes, 34 B.T.A. 212 (1936); Estate of Isadore Benjamin, 28
T.C. 101 (1957).
03 Christopher v. Burnet, supra note 60.
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conclusive, however, and even if the withdrawals are carried on
the corporate books as a loan, other factors may be considered
controlling and the withdrawal taxed as a dividend.04 In Ben E.
Meyer,65 the Tax Court in discussing this factor stated that "book
entries cannot be used to conceal realities." Thus, it would ap-
pear that the lack of "loan" treatment is detrimental to the stock-
holder's case, while its presence, though not controlling, is a strong
corroborating circumstance.
3. Issuance of promissory notes or other security. The ab-
sence of a promissory note is not necessarily detrimental to the
stockholder's contention that the withdrawal was a loan. The
absence or presence of notes is merely another factor in determin-
ing whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists. Thus, in H. C.
Thorman,66 the taxpayer was the sole stockholder and retained
certain corporate income as he collected it without turning any
part over to the corporation. He did, however, pay corporate
accounts as they became due out of these sums. No notes of
indebtedness were given nor did he ever pay any interest. How-
ever, very-accurate records were kept of these transactions. The
Tax Court held that these sums were, nevertheless, valid loans
stating that, "notes do not create an indebtedness, but only
evidence it." The court further concluded that the controlling
factors in this case were the statements of the taxpayer, plus the
fact that the accounts were kept so meticulously. Likewise, in
several other cases, withdrawals have been held to be valid loans
in spite of the absence of promissory notes or other evidence of
indebtedness.67
On the other hand where notes were given, this has been a
strong but not conclusive factor in sustaining the stockholder's
case.68 In Daniel Hunt,69 notes were issued by a stockholder who
6 4 In George P. Marshall, 82 B.T.A. 956 (1935), the withdrawals were car-
ried on the corporate books as an account receivable from the stockholder, but
the court held it to be a dividend because no interest was charged and other
evidence showed that there was no intention to repay; Ben E. Meyer, 45 B.T.A.
228 (1941).
65 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
66 P-H 1953 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 53287.
67 Irving T. Bush, 45 B.T.A. 609 (1942); Jacksonville Paper Co., P-H 1954
T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 54223; Ward v. Commissioner, 131 F. Supp. 887 (D.C. Col.,
1955).6 8 In Victor Shaken, supra note 2, the Tax Court said that the execution of a
note cannot be ignored. See also, Herman M. Rhodes, supra note 9; Corporate
Investment Company, 40 B.T.A. 1156 (1939).
69 6 B.T.A. 558 (1927).
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withdrew large sums but the court, nevertheless, held the with-
drawals to be dividends where other evidence showed that there
was no intention to repay the alleged loans. Since the stockholder
is usually in complete control of the corporation in these cases,
notes may be little more than a paper transaction; it may be
highly improbable that the stockholder would ever cause the
corporation to enforce the notes if he defaulted in payment. In
Ben E. Meyer, 70 the court in discussing the weight to be attached
to notes stated:
71
We do not regard the giving of... notes ... of weighty
significance... since the collection of these demand notes
as well as the making of some, was under the absolute con,
trol of the petitioner through control of the corporation and
the notes could at their will, never become actually due and
payable.
In spite of these statements, however, it is not without significance
that very few cases have been litigated where notes or other
evidences of indebtedness were present. This suggests that the
Commissioner is more willing to treat transactions evidenced by
notes as bona fide loans.
4. Payment of interest. Where interest is paid upon corporate
withdrawals, this is strong corroborating evidence that the parties
considered the withdrawals to be bona fide loans.72 However,
failure to pay interest will not prevent a withdrawal from being
considered a bona fide loan if the transaction is otherwise in
proper form and in good faith. 3 In discussing the lack of interest
payments in Victor Shaker,74 the Tax Court stated that, "failure
to charge interest is not determinative here." In spite of this lan-
guage, however, interest payments constitute good evidence in
favor of the stockholder. In practically all cases where the with-
drawals have been held to be dividends, lack of interest payments
has been mentioned by the court as another factor tending to
show that the parties did not intend to create a bona fide in-
debtedness.75
70 Supra note 64.
71 Id. at 240.
72 Corporate Investment Co., supra note 68; George S. Graves, 38 B.T.A. 727
(1938).
73 John Hamilton Perkins, supra note 54.
74 Supra note 55.75 Christopher v. Burnet, supra note 60; Emma Faronga, P-H 1955 T.C. Mem.
Dec. sec. 55278.
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5. Collateral security. Since the deposit of collateral security
in connection with stockholder withdrawals from a close corpora-
tion would be unnecessary and impractical in many cases, this
factor rarely appears for discussion in the reported cases. How-
ever, where collateral security has been pledged in sufficient
amount to secure the repayment of the withdrawal, it should be
strong evidence in favor of the stockholder. In Al Goodman,7 an
advance of $145,000 to the sole stockholder was secured by stock
in the corporation having a value in excess of $290,000. The
court in concluding that the withdrawal was a loan did not give
this factor controlling significance but did indicate that generally
security was a factor tending to show a loan. Since stock of the
corporation was pledged as collateral by the sole stockholder, it
is believed that the court was right in considering this of little
significance. Here, it is questionable whether the corporation,
with the consent of the stockholder, will enforce the collateral.
If it did so in the Goodman case it would force a sale of the stock-
holder's interest. Thus, the only significance that can be attached
to collateral security is showing some evidence of intention and
good faith. Where the collateral is put up by one of several stock-
holders to secure a withdrawal, the likelihood of its ultimate en-
forcement increases and the courts should accordingly attach
more importance to it.
6. Purpose of the Withdrawal. Although this factor should
not logically have any bearing on the issue of whether a bona
fide loan was made, it has been mentioned in several cases before
the Tax Court. In George P. Marshall,77 where withdrawals were
held to be dividends, the court pointed out among other things
that the corporation had sufficient funds to declare a dividend
and stated that the sole stockholder "used the money for living
and personal expenses". In the Goodman case, the advances had
been made to the sole stockholder so he could pay his individual
tax liability. The court in holding this withdrawal to be a valid
loan stated that, "the advance was not for personal living expenses
or the like.... It was, for Al, an unusual, nonrecurring emergency
situation." These cases seem to indicate that if withdrawals are
made for personal living expenses or the like, courts will be
7628 T.C. 228 (1955).
77 Supra note 64.
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more inclined to treat these sums as constructive dividends to
the stockholder. Several other cases, however, have held with-
drawals to be loans even though made for a personal reason, such
as to remodel the principal stockholder's residence,78 or to gam-
ble .7 The only case in which the Court of Appeals has considered
this point was in Regensburg v. Commissioner.0 The court there
held that it was error to admit evidence that the stockholder used
the advances for gambling, as the use to which the money was
put had no relevancy on the issue of loans versus dividends. The
court did not, however, consider its admittance so prejudicial as
to require reversal of the Tax Court.
7. Repayments and ability to repay. Where there has been
full repayment of an advance, no question will ordinarily arise as
to the treatment of the transaction as a loan. Where no payments
or only partial repayments have been made, however, courts have
found some difficulty in evaluating this fact and giving it proper
weight. Lack of any payments at all by the stockholder will not
necessarily be detrimental to his position if other factors over-
come this missing element.s - However, where the repayments are
only made after the Commissioner has contended that the with-
drawals were dividends, they will be regarded as of little sig-
nificance. 2 Also where the repayments or credits are insignificant
considered in relation to the size of the withdrawals, they will be
held to be designed merely to give "color" of loans.8 3 Thus, if
repayments are made, this adds to the weight of the stockholder's
case, but they must not be made as an afterthought and must be
reasonable considering the amount of the withdrawal.
Intertwined with the fact of actual repayments is the financial
position of the stockholder. This question bears strongly on the
determination of whether he had an intention to repay the with-
drawal. A stockholder who was insolvent or practically so, could
hardly be said to have any intention or expectation of repaying
withdrawals, particularly if they are large. In H. L. Gumbiner,4
78 Courtemanche v. Earle, 45 AFTR 887 (D.C. Ore. 1953).
7 0 Walter Freeman, P-H 1957 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 57020.
80 Supra note 56.
81 Courtemanche v. Earle, supra note 78.
82 Regensburg v. Commissioner, supra note 56.
8
3 Ben E. Meyer, supra note 64.
84 P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 46299.
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the corporation made advances of approximately $61,000 to a
stockholder at a time when he had other large outstanding liabili-
ties. A small credit of $200 was made in one year and $8,154 was
credited the next year out of the stockholder's salary. In holding
the withdrawal a dividend, the Tax Court stressed the fact that,
"petitioner apparently had no funds with which to repay any
loans made to him by the corporation." In the Regensburg case,
the four stockholders over a period of 40 years made withdrawals
of approximately $3,000,000. In holding these sums to be divi-
dends the court observed that the stockholders had nothing but
their stock with which to repay these alleged loans which was of
much less value. A similar observation was made in William C.
Baird,85 where two stockholders made withdrawals totaling ap-
proximately $98,000 in the years 1946 to 1951. No dividends had
been paid by the corporation since 1931. In sustaining the Com-
missioner's contention that this sum was a taxable dividend the
court stated: 86
It is also significant that there was no apparent ceiling for
such withdrawals, nor did the brothers [stockholders] have
ready resources available with which to reimburse the com-
pany.
In this case it was also significant that notes were not given as
evidence of the alleged loans until the Revenue Service had
checked the taxpayers' returns and suggested that these sums
should be treated as dividends. The language of these cases in-
dicates, however, that ability to repay is in the opinion of the
courts a significant factor in determining the intention of the
stockholder and the corporation at the time of withdrawal. Where
the stockholder is insolvent or practically so, it would only be the
extraordinary case where other factors would be sufficient to out-
weigh this fact and sustain a holding that the withdrawals were
bona fide loans.
8. Ratio of withdrawals to earnings and profits. Where the
withdrawals exhaust the net profits of the corporation, it would
appear that this fact is strong evidence of the distribution of a
dividend. Thus in C. W. Murchision,87 the stockholder in accord-
85 25 T.C. 387 (1955).
86 Id. at 896.
8732 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
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ance with a long standing practice of making substantial with-
drawals from the corporation withdrew the sum of $115,170.37
in a year in which the corporation had profits of only $135,933.83.
The Tax Court held that the substance of the plan was to make a
dividend distribution in the guise of a loan for the purpose of
avoiding high surtaxes. Likewise, payments by the corporation of
$18,086.14 in discharge of the stockholder's obligations, such pay-
ments representing the approximate net income of the corporation
for a period of several years, were held to be a dividend distribu-
tion to the stockholder.88 Where the corporation has declared no
dividends in the year in question or for many years, this fact
strengthens the Commissioner's position that the withdrawals
should be treated as a taxable dividend.
9. Ratio of loans to stockholdings. Where there is only one
stockholder, the ratio of loans to the number of shares held is of
no significance. However, where there are several stockholders,
this factor takes on added importance and may even be decisive.
Disproportionate withdrawals will not necessarily support the
stockholders' contention that they are not taxable dividends.8 '
Courts usually point out that the fact that other stockholders did
not object is immaterial. This factor is not without significance,
however, and courts have occasionally pointed to it along with
other factors in support of a conclusion that the withdrawals were
bona fide loans. 0 Where the withdrawals are in exact proportion
to stockholdings, it is very strong evidence that they are divi-
dends.Y1 In this instance a proportionate distribution would point
to a dividend because it is unlikely that all stockholders would
need to borrow funds from the corporation in the exact ratio of
their stockholdings.
Since all the above factors may be considered in determining
whether a withdrawal is a loan or a dividend (with varying
weight attached in different cases), the line is often vague and
88 H. L. Gumbiner, supra note 84; In Eugene Vassallo, 23 T.C. 656 (1955),
the fact that the taxpayer withdrew substantially all the net earnings of the
corporation was deemed a significant factor in the court's determination that these
sums were dividends.
89 Christopher v. Burnet, supra note 60.
00 Kate E. Ryan, supra note 54.
91 Chattanooga Savings Bank v. Brewer, 17 F. 2d 79 (6th Cir. 1927); R. E.
Nelson, 19 T.C. 575 (1952).
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uncertain. When it is found necessary to make withdrawals from
the corporation, care must be taken to insure that the trans-
action points to a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship. Since it
is a common practice for stockholders of a closely held corpora-
tion to borrow funds from their corporation instead of from out-
side sources, this problem is particularly important to them. If
the three year statute of limitations has expired, this does not
mean that the question has been closed. Where the distribution,
which is ultimately held to be a dividend, exceeds 25% of the
reported gross income of the stockholder for the years in which
the withdrawals were made, the statute of limitations runs for 6
years.92 In this case, all that is required is that the notice of
deficiency be mailed by the Commissioner within 6 years from the
time that the returns were filed.
93
Cancellation by the Corporation of Stockholder's Indebtedness
Created by Withdrawals.
It frequently happens that the withdrawals are not checked
by the Internal Revenue Service until after the expiration of the
statute of limitations. In this situation, if the withdrawal was a
dividend when made, the shareholder will escape tax thereon.
In these circumstances, however, it is likely that the Commissioner
will take the position that the withdrawals were loans. This is
particularly so where the withdrawals have been subsequently
cancelled by the corporation. In this situation, it is settled that
the cancellation of a stockholder's indebtedness to the corporation
will give rise to a taxable dividend if the stockholder is solvent
and the corporation has sufficient earnings and profits to support
a dividend."
Where a solvent taxpayer settles a debt for less than the full
indebtedness, the amount saved constitutes income to him.""
However, in Helvering v. American Dental Company0 it was
held that there is no income to the debtor where the debt can-
92 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, see. 6101(e).
93William C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387 (1955).
4Hugh R. Miller, 25 B.T.A. 418 (1932); Clair D. Reason, P-H 1942 T.C.
Mem. Dec. see. 42552; Floyd W. Bell, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 56191;
Carl G. Ortmayer, 28 T.C. 64 (1957).
95 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
06 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
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cellation is a gift arising out of the voluntary forgiveness by the
creditor, provided that no consideration moved from the debtor.
It appears to be settled, however, that there is no voluntary for-
giveness within the American Dental Company decision where
a stockholder of a corporation causes his corporation to forgive
his indebtednessY7 In F. W. Leadbetter,9 8 the court in discussing
the forgiveness of a debt owed to his corporation stated:99
There was no voluntary act on the part of the... company
which may be construed to constitute a voluntary forgive-
ness of part of the debt. The act of the company was the
act of the petitioner... The parties to the transaction were
not dealing at arm's length. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it would seem almost impossible for a corporation to for-
give the indebtedness of its stockholders without the shareholders
realizing a taxable dividend.
The stockholder, however, is almost invariably contending
that the distribution was a dividend and is therefore barred by
the statute of limitations. 00 He usually fares no better with this
argument than he does when he is taking the position that, the
distribution is a loan prior to the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions. The position of the courts as to such a contention on the
part of the stockholder was made clear by statements in the recent
case of Wentworth.' In this case the stockholder withdrew
$90,000 which he charged against the capital of the corporation.
The court held that it was improper to charge capital in the
absence of a redemption of stock or a partial liquidation. The tax-
payer contended alternatively that the advance to him was in
reality a dividend from the corporation and should have been
taxed as such when received. After observing that the taxpayer
did not so treat them upon receipt since he did not report these
sums as taxable income, the Tax Court stated: 0 2
We are not so naive as to think petitioner would ever claim
the unclear book entries show a dividend distribution to
9 7 Supra note 94.
98 P-H 1948 T.C. Mem. Dec. sec. 48387.
9, Id. at 1224.
o00 Such an argument was made in Hirsch Improvement Co., P-H 1942 T.C.
Mee. Dec. see. 42559, by the stockholder while the Government was contending
that the distribution was a loan.
10125 T.C. 1210 (1956), aftd, 244 F. 2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957).
102 Id. at 1215.
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him, were it not for the fact that the income tax on such
distribution is now barred by the statute of limitations.
Thus, the stockholder is put in the position of having to argue
that a sum which he did not report as income when received, was
nevertheless income at that time and that the subsequent can-
cellation of the advance cannot, therefore, be treated as a realiza-
tion of income. It is not surprising that the courts are unsym-
pathetic to his position. It is held that cancellation gives rise to
a dividend, not in the year of withdrawal but in the year in which
the cancellation occurs. In Wiese v. Commissioner,1 3 the stock-
holder was held to have realized a dividend in 1932 when the
corporation cancelled his indebtedness and not during the years
1926 to 1932 when the withdrawals were made. This is under-
standable as nothing would be gained by holding that a dividend
was realized when the withdrawals occurred as these years would
still be largely barred by the statute of limitations. 10 4
Not only may the stockholder be held to have received a con-
structive dividend upon withdrawals from his corporation or on
subsequent cancellation, but where the withdrawals render the
corporation unable to pay its taxes, the stockholder may be taxed
upon the full amount of the withdrawal as a dividend and also
liable as a transferee of the corporation for the amount of the
taxes the corporation was unable to pay.105 In this area, therefore,
care must be taken where withdrawals are necessary to insure
treatment of the transactions as bona fide loans by observing all
of the qualifying factors. In considering any cancellation of the
stockholder's indebtedness, consideration should be given to the
possible adverse tax consequences that may result, and the parties
should select a year in which the cancellation would produce the
least unfavorable tax consequences.
10393 F. 2d 921 (8th Cir. 1938).
104 Section 108(a)(1)(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
for a specific exclusion from gross income resulting from the cancellation of an
indebtedness for which the taxpayer is liable, or subject to which the taxpayer
holds property, "if the indebtedness was incurred or assumed by an... individual
in connection with property used in his trade or business." To take advantage of
this section, however, the taxpayer must consent to a reduction of the basis of
such property. While the provisions appear sufficiently broad enough to cover the
situation where a corporation cancels the indebtedness of its stockholders, it is
believed that this section was not intended to apply. If such cancellation gives
rise to a dividend within sec. 801(a) and sec. 316 (a)(1) and (2), then it would
appear that this situation could not be brought under the 108 provisions. It is not
the type of bona fide indebtedness cancellation contemplated by 108.
105 Eugene Vassallo, supra note 88.
